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Immigration, Emigration,
Fungible Labour and the Retreat
from Progressive Taxation
HENRY ORDOWER

With emphasis on the US, this chapter explores the role that taxation plays in the
movement of people and capital. The chapter addresses the relationship between
taxes and retention of capital, including tax incentives for capital investment, shifting
tax burdens from capital to labour as progressive taxation wanes, and rules preventing the escape of capital from its current taxing jurisdiction. Next, the discussion
moves on to consider how taxes supplement immigration policy to attract capital currently outside the jurisdiction. The chapter then queries whether taxes play
any significant role in attracting or retaining skilled labour before identifying how
tax trends disadvantage ‘less desirable’, fungible, frequently immigrant labour in
response to anti-immigration and anti-immigrant public sentiment. The chapter
concludes by observing a relationship between taxation and the unwillingness of
societies to help those who culturally, ethnically, racially or religiously differ from the
bulk of the membership in the society as that society may change from time to time.

I. Introduction
Family unity has driven US immigration policy for legal, permanent immigration.1 Admission categories other than family immigration are ‘merit-based’ even
within the special category for diversity immigration.2 Merit criteria assign priority
to exceptional individuals with critical skills and education. Unskilled, fungible3
workers are often admitted seasonally but permanent status is elusive4 – even

18

USC §1151 et seq.

2 ibid.
3 See

discussion of fungible workers in text attached to n 121.

4 ibid.
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those holding work permits under temporary asylum status may face removal
from the US.5
Despite the apparent national origin-based immigration policy advanced
early in President Trump’s administration,6 recent immigration policy emphasises
economic rather than cultural or religious distinctions.7 Consistent with meritand economic contribution-based immigration, the President has instructed
federal agencies to enforce a longstanding, but historically unenforced, requirement that sponsors of immigrants reimburse governmental expenditures on
behalf of sponsored immigrants, including healthcare and welfare payments.8 A
new regulation9 denies ‘green cards’10 to lawful immigrants on the basis that they
are ‘public charges’11 when they claim public benefits.
Economic immigration restrictions also underlie an interim final rule12
precluding asylum seekers from applying for US asylum if they pass through a
third country without applying for and being denied asylum in that country.13 The
rule is comparable to the EU priority for asylum application in the first country of
entry.14 A grant of admission and asylum permits the asylum seeker to move freely
throughout the EU. Most US asylum seekers come from Central American countries, are economically stressed, and travel over land through Mexico. If granted
asylum in Mexico, they have no right of admission to the US.

5 ND Schwartz, ‘Washington Wants to Deport Washington’s Builders’, New York Times (15 September
2019) Business 1 (Salvadorans’ proposed removal).
6 Bans on immigration from predominantly Muslim countries. US Department of Homeland
Security (DHS), ‘Executive Orders on Protecting the Homeland’, available at https://www.dhs.gov/
executive-orders-protecting-homeland (accessed 3 December 2018).
7 MD Shear, ‘ Trump Immigration Plan Emphasizes Immigrants’ Skills Over Family Ties’, The New
York Times (15 May 2019), available at https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/15/us/politics/trumpimmigration-kushner.html (accessed 17 May 2019).
8 M Talev and Justin Sink, ‘ Trump Looks to Threat of Welfare Bills to Curb Immigration’, Bloomberg
(23 May 2019), available at https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-05-23/trump-ordersgovernment-to-collect-bills-for-immigrant-welfare (accessed 24 May 2019).
9 US Citizenship and Immigration Service (USCIS), DHS, Inadmissibility on Public Charge Grounds,
84 FR 41292 (August 14, 2019) (effective 15 October 2019).
10 ‘Green card’ is the identification card that the USCIS issues to immigrants qualified to reside and
work permanently in the US. USCIS, DHS, ‘Green Card’, available at https://www.uscis.gov/greencard
(accessed 12 September 2019).
11 8 USC §1201(a)(4) (individuals who are likely to become public charges are ineligible to immigrate
to or remain in the US).
12 USCIS, DHS and Executive Office for Immigration Review, Temporary Final Rule, Asylum
Eligibility and Procedural Modifications, 84 FR 33829 (July 16, 2019).
13 A Ahmed and P Villegas, ‘“ This Takes Away All Hope”: Rule Bars Most Applicants for Asylum in
US’, New York Times (12 September 2019), available at https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/12/world/
americas/asylum-seekers.html (discussing the Supreme Court decision to remove the lower court
injunction barring enforcement of the rule).
14 Regulation (EU) No 604/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013
establishing the criteria and mechanisms for determining the Member State responsible for examining an application for international protection lodged in one of the Member States by a third-country
national or a stateless person (29 June 2013), available at https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/
TXT/?uri=CELEX:32013R0604 (accessed 7 September 2019).
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The Social Security Administration sends ‘no match letters’ to employers of low
wage immigrants in industries that may employ unauthorised workers notifying
them that some employees’ names do not match their social security numbers.15
The notices do not require employers to take action but exert implicit pressure
to screen for unauthorised workers. Employers may dismiss workers rather than
investing the time and expense to correct possible errors.
Historically, immigration was a key source of much-needed labour in growing
economies. The US was built by immigrants and guest workers, who sometimes
were denied permanent residence and whose contributions were not always
acknowledged.16 European countries relied heavily on guest workers from the
mid-twentieth century to the earlier twenty-first century, often without granting
the workers the right to reside permanently or to become citizens.
In the twenty-first century, conflict zones and weak economies drive immigration from those areas to wealthier and more stable areas, while high taxes and
regulation fuel emigration from wealthy stable economies to lower tax, less regulated jurisdictions. Labour flight to lower tax jurisdictions historically has not
been prevalent because rendition of services was location dependent. The rapid
growth of technology, however, has made many industries independent of the
location of their service providers.17 Cross-border competition for some labour
has grown.
While top scientists and medical professionals have been in demand since
the early years of the twentieth century, demand for technology expertise has
accompanied growing international reliance on technology. The emergence of
English as the international technical language has removed linguistic barriers to
commerce. Individuals with technical expertise are able to work remotely or relocate. Competition in many realms has become international. Developing countries
which devoted their limited resources to training their citizens to develop technical skills are concerned those educated individuals may move to countries offering
higher salaries and better living circumstances.18

15 Miriam Jordan, ‘Letters From Washington: Your Employees Could Be Undocumented’
New York Times (16 May 2019), available at https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/16/us/immigrantsundocumented-no-match.html (accessed 17 May 2019). The policy of sending ‘no match letters’ was
suspended from 2012 to 2019.
16 Chinese labourers’ contribution to building the transcontinental railroad in the US was not
celebrated until the 150th anniversary in 2019. J Katz, ‘The Transcontinental Railroad Wouldn’t
Have Been Built Without the Hard Work of Chinese Laborers’ (2010) Smithsonian Magazine,
available at https://www.smithsonianmag.com/smithsonian-institution/transcontinental-railroadchinese-labourers-180971919/#d40bEvGCK1RTcGYh.99 (accessed 25 May 2019); GH Chang, Ghosts
of Gold Mountain The Epic Story of the Chinese Who Built the Transcontinental Railway (Boston MA,
Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2019).
17 Call centres for product support or marketing are examples, while technological services lend
themselves to remote contact between clients and providers.
18 Y Brauner, ‘Brain Drain Taxation as Development Policy’ (2010) 55 Saint Louis University Law
Journal 221; M Lister, ‘A Tax-Credit Approach to Addressing Brain Drain’ (2017) 62 Saint Louis
University Law Journal 63.
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Whatever the reasons one chooses to emigrate, the immigrant expects equal
and fair treatment by the receiving country. Tax burden distribution in the US
discriminates somewhat against people of colour19 and low wage immigrants.20
Yet immigration has been largely absent from tax policy debate.21 With emphasis
on the US, this chapter inquires whether the taxation system provides fair treatment to all immigrant taxpayers or favours some immigrants over others.
This chapter first reviews the question of tax fairness in the distribution of tax
burdens and whether tax structure discriminates against or favours taxpayers with
differing characteristics. The chapter then addresses the relationship between taxes
and retention of capital, including tax incentives for capital investment, shifting
tax burdens from capital to labour, and rules preventing the escape of capital from
its current taxing jurisdiction. The section following considers how taxes supplement immigration policy to attract capital currently outside the jurisdiction. Next,
the discussion contemplates whether taxes play any significant role in attracting22
or retaining skilled labour.23 The final portion looks at taxes and tax trends and
identifies how they disadvantage or benefit fungible labourers who often are immigrants and then concludes.

II. Tax Fairness: From Progressivity to Regressivity
One fundamental principle of tax fairness – ‘horizontal equity’ – requires the tax
law to treat like taxpayers alike. US tax law is racially neutral on its face. While no
discriminatory intent manifests itself in tax legislative history and strong public
policy principles preclude enactment of expressly racist legislation, critical tax
scholars have identified provisions of the US tax law that discriminate racially24
or sexually.25 Advantageous treatment of investment income favours higher
income taxpayers.26 Wealthy and high income taxpayers capture most charitable

19 DA Brown, ‘ Teaching Civil Rights through the Basic Tax Course’ (2010) 54 Saint Louis University
Law Journal 809, 813–15 (blacks receive fewer tax benefits from home ownership because they tend to
be renters).
20 See nn 121–143 and accompanying text.
21 Cf H Ordower, ‘ Taxing Others in the Age of Trump: Foreigners (and the Politically Weak) as Tax
Subjects’ (2017) 62 Saint Louis University Law Journal 157 (discussing tax elements disadvantaging
lower income immigrants).
22 PR Dukmedjian and N Girleanu, ‘Luxembourg Offers Tax Incentives to Attract Highly
Skilled Employees’, Tax Notes (6 December 2018), available at https://www.taxnotes.com/
worldwide-tax-daily/employment-taxes/luxembourg-offers-tax-incentives-attract-highly-skilledemployees/2018/12/06/28l6b (accessed 1 October 2019).
23 See n 18 for literature examples.
24 Brown (n 19).
25 NC Staudt, ‘ Taxing Housework’ (1995–1996) 84 Georgetown Law Journal 1571.
26 H Ordower, ‘Schedularity in US Income Taxation and its Effect on Tax Distribution’ (2014) 108
Northwestern University Law Review 905.
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contribution tax benefits.27 Among higher income taxpayers who enjoy tax expenditures, racial minorities are underrepresented.28
During the middle part of the twentieth century, a progressive income tax
became a principal revenue source in advanced democracies.29 Progressivity in
taxation became the second fundamental principle of tax fairness: ‘vertical equity’.
The principle assumes that as an individual’s income or wealth increases, the individual’s ability and responsibility to pay tax increases disproportionally. In their
seminal article on progressive taxation,30 professors Blum and Kalven catalogued
arguments for progressivity observing that regressive taxation is anathema to fair
distribution of the tax burden and lacks support: ‘[i]t is so clear no one today
favors any tax because it is regressive that the term itself has become colored’.31
They concluded that smoothing economic inequality through redistribution of
wealth is the strongest justification for progressive taxation,32 understanding that
‘the drawbacks of progression in terms of productivity must be weighed against its
possible merits in allocating the tax burden fairly’.33
Despite its foundation in horizontal and vertical equity principles, basic tax
structure tilted toward proportional and regressive taxes during the latter half
of the twentieth century under the pressures of political influence of wealth and
growing governmental revenue needs. A progressive income tax was difficult
to collect efficiently and its high marginal rates imposed on mostly middleincome individuals from whom the state had to collect the bulk of its revenue
were unpopular.34 Legislatures sought other sources of revenue, especially in the
welfare states of Northern Europe where less progressive and even regressive taxes
emerged to carry the welfare state burden. Chief among those regressive taxes was
value added tax (VAT).
VAT is somewhat hidden because the tax is built into the cost of goods and
services. Taxpayer liquidity concerns of income taxes are absent because its inclusion in the price leaves the consumer a choice to pay the tax or not buy the item.
27 H Ordower, ‘Charitable Contributions of Services: Charitable Gift Planning for Non-Itemizers’
(2014) 67 Tax Lawyer 517. Cf JJ Thorndike, ‘Tax History: Charity Deductions Are for the Rich – and
That Was Always the Plan’ (2019) 164 Tax Notes 1856.
28 US Dept of Commence, Census Bureau, 2012 Statistical Abstract, Section 13. Income, Expenditures,
Poverty, and Wealth, Table 697. ‘Money Income of Households – Percent Distribution by Income Level,
Race, and Hispanic Origin, in Constant (2009) Dollars’, available at https://www2.census.gov/library/
publications/2011/compendia/statab/131ed/tables/12s0697.pdf?# (accessed 4 May 2020).
29 The top marginal rate of tax in the US was 92% in 1952. Tax Foundation, ‘US Federal Individual
Income Tax Rates History, 1862–2013 (Nominal and Inflation-Adjusted Brackets)’ [31], available at
https://taxfoundation.org/us-federal-individual-income-tax-rates-history-1913-2013-nominal-andinflation-adjusted-brackets/ (accessed 15 September 2019). Similarly, high marginal rates were
prevalent or soon to be so in most European countries not in the Soviet sphere of influence.
30 WJ Blum and H Kalven Jr, ‘ The Uneasy Case for Progressive Taxation’ (1952) 19 University of
Chicago Law Review 417.
31 ibid 419.
32 ibid 520.
33 ibid 444.
34 SO Lodin, ‘Swedish Tax Reforms 1971–77 – Why So Many?’ (1977) 56 Acta Universitatis
Stockholmiensis Studia Juridica Stockholmiensia 181.
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VAT has been so popular that the EU harmonised VAT taxation at a minimum rate
of 15 per cent.35
For many moderate- and middle-income taxpayers, income from wages is their
significant source of income. Since those taxpayers consume most of their wages
for living expenses subject to VAT, VAT is effectively a tax on labour. VATs tend to
be regressive because the lower the individual’s income and wealth, the more the
individual must dedicate their limited resources to basic living expenses subject
to VAT. By contrast wealthier taxpayers devote significant amounts of income and
wealth to investment rather than consumer purchases. Since purchases of intangible investment property such as corporate shares and bonds are not subject to
VAT, income devoted to such investments remains free from VAT.
VAT rates have increased and income tax rates have declined over the last
half century. Taxes on income from investment have declined disproportionally
to taxes on income from personal services while supplemental wage taxes have
grown. Frequently the wage taxes are indirect taxes that are imposed upon the
employer but probably borne by employees in the form of lower wages than they
otherwise might receive if there were no tax.36
Retreat from progressive taxation is an international trend that coincides with
changing immigration patterns and increasing need to accept diverse refugee
populations. Some immigrants will find work and invest capital and begin to pay
income taxes quickly; others may not. Rules governing admission of immigrants
to stable, developed countries try to anticipate income productivity.37 Even if they
differ ethnically, racially and religiously from the majority populace, wealthy and
highly educated immigrants receive favourable admission decisions from immigration authorities more frequently than do conflict and economic refugees.38
Progressive taxation of the mid-twentieth century yielded to proportional and
even regressive taxation in the twenty-first century as the burden of taxation shifted
from capital to labour. While capital mobility can account for the shift from taxing
capital to taxing labour, immigration also may have contributed to that shift.

III. Retaining Rich People and their Capital
Professor Winters argues that civil oligarchs use their wealth to influence tax system
changes that reduce progressive taxes and substitute regressive ones. He sees the
35 Council Directive 2006/112/EC of 28 November 2006 on the common system of value added tax,
available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2006:347:0001:0118:en:PDF
(accessed 15 September 2019). Exemptions and reduced rates are not uniform throughout the EU.
36 M Friedman, ‘ Transfer Payments and the Social Security System’ (1965) 11 The Conference Board
Record 7.
37 Compare the US shift to merit based immigration: see text at n 7 above.
38 L Adim, ‘Between Benefit and Abuse: Immigrant Investment Programs’ (2017) 62 Saint Louis
University Law Journal 121; A Christians, ‘Buying In: Residence and Citizenship by Investment’ (2017)
62 Saint Louis University Law Journal 51 (both articles discussing ‘golden visas’ for investors).
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reduction of the maximum marginal income tax rate to be a result of oligarchical activity in order to gain anti-progressive taxation allies by including increased
numbers of the wealthy but not obscenely wealthy as allies against progressive
taxes by pushing them into the highest marginal brackets.39 Alternative or additional forces driving a retreat from progressive taxation may have been growing
tax avoidance and the international focus on retaining wealthy taxpayers in the
face of international competition for their capital40 and their skills.
High marginal income tax rates arguably encourage taxpayers to engage in
aggressive tax planning. The tax sheltering industry in the US developed during
the years of high marginal rates of income tax.41 Yet, taxpayers often try to avoid
even low rate taxes too.42 Experience shows that even as income tax rates declined,
taxpayers continued to seek aggressively structured planning opportunities to
avoid or decrease the tax. So-called ‘son of boss’ structures in the US avoided the
federal income tax largely on low rate long term capital gain then capped at 15 or
20 per cent.43 Similarly, the S corporation payroll tax shelter avoided at most a 2.9
per cent combined employer-employee payroll tax.44
Expatriation to avoid very high taxes long has been a matter of concern in
high marginal rate jurisdictions having territorial income tax systems.45 Some
39 JA Winters, ‘Civil Oligarchies’ in JA Winters, Oligarchy (Cambridge, CUP, 2011) ch 5 (distinguishing oligarchs from the merely wealthy and demonstrating that the extremely wealthy oligarchs bear an
ever decreasing share of the tax burden in the US).
40 A Alstadsæter, N Johannesen and G Zucman, ‘ Tax Evasion and Inequality’ (2019) 109 American
Economic Review 2073 (using leaked data showing that offshore tax evasion is highly concentrated
among the rich in Scandinavia and highlighting the importance of factoring in tax evasion to properly
measure inequality).
41 H Ordower, ‘ The Culture of Tax Avoidance’ (2010) 55 Saint Louis ULJ 47.
42 Ordower (n 41); Alstadsæter, Johannesen and Zucman (n 40) (current lower than historical rates
under Scandinavian income taxes do not stop offshore tax avoidance or evasion by wealthy taxpayers).
43 26 USC §1(h) (imposing a reduced rate of tax to net capital gain relative to the rate imposed on
income of other types). Unlike the federal income tax that applies a reduced income tax rate to net
capital gain, state income taxes generally apply an identical rate to net capital gain as they apply to
income of all other types. State income taxes vary considerably from state to state and add an additional tax of as much as 3% in Indiana or 13% in California, for example, using 2019 rates. K Loughead
and E Wei, ‘State Individual Income Tax Rates and Brackets for 2019’ (Tax Foundation Fiscal Fact No.
643, 2019), available at https://files.taxfoundation.org/20190515164552/State-Individual-Income-TaxRates-and-Brackets-for-2019-FF-643.pdf (accessed 29 May 2019). 26 USC is the Internal Revenue
Code of 1986, as amended (the ‘Code’). In the following, sections of the Code will be referred to as ‘IRC
§’ followed by a number.
44 Citizens for Tax Justice, ‘Payroll Tax Loophole Used by John Edwards and Newt Gingrich
Remains Unaddressed by Congress’ (6 September 2013), available at https://www.ctj.org/payroll-taxloophole-used-by-john-edwards-and-newt-gingrich-remains-unaddressed-by-congress/ (accessed
17 September 2019).
45 Consider the Beatles and their tax moves described in N Irwin, ‘ The Beatles were the Mitt Romney
of the 1960s, and other policy lessons from the Fab Four’, The Washington Post Blog, 10 January 2014,
available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2014/01/10/the-beatles-were-themitt-romney-of-the-1960s-and-other-policy-lessons-from-the-fab-four/. Under a territorial system,
taxpayers who are not resident in the taxing jurisdiction are subject to tax only on their incomes from
sources in the taxing jurisdiction and not on their income from performance of services outside the
taxing jurisdiction. The US taxes its citizens and permanent residents on their worldwide income so
US taxpayers must relinquish their citizenship or green cards to free themselves from the US income
tax. 26 CFR §1.1-1.
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countries address part of the impact of expatriation with continuation taxes,46
but those anti-avoidance limitations on expatriation to avoid tax are an imperfect
solution. Decreasing marginal rates of income tax and repeal or reduction in taxes
at death has not staunched the flow of capital to low tax jurisdictions47 or expatriations from the US and other countries.48 Improved communication technology
and stable, safe residential environments in many low-tax or no-tax island jurisdictions enable US and European nationals to emigrate without losing contract or
control over businesses operating in their home countries.
Nevertheless, as global competition for capital increased in the latter decades
of the twentieth century, the steeply progressive income taxes with high maximum rates of tax characteristic of developed countries during the middle years
of the twentieth century yielded to systems with moderate or flat progression and
moderate maximum rates of tax.49 Schedularity under income tax systems has
increased with its nearly discrete tax bases to which differing tax rate schedules
apply.50 Under schedularity, taxes have tended to increase on less mobile income
from labour and to decrease on more mobile income from property.51 As VAT
rates and wage taxes on labour increased, taxes on capital gain stabilised or became
preferential;52 taxes on income from capital, as opposed to gain on the appreciation in the value of capital, also enjoyed a preference in some instances;53 and rates
of tax on corporations declined and continue to decline.54 Recently the US enacted
a preferential schedule for income from the conduct of businesses, other than the
business of an employee, through a 20 per cent deduction of the amount of income
from the business.55 The new deduction favours capital intensive businesses and
would seem to violate the horizontal equity principle. Periodic wealth taxes and
gift and estate taxes on the transmission of wealth similarly have declined or

46 Sweden, for example: 3. Kap. 3 § 3., 7 § Inkomstskattelag (1999:1229) (Income Tax Law Sweden),
available at https://lagen.nu/1999:1229 (accessed 3 October 2019) (taxing expatriates on their income
from all sources (obegränsad skattskyldighet) for five years following expatriation if they continue to
have substantial connection with Sweden).
47 Alstadsæter, Johannesen and Zucman (n 40).
48 Department of the Treasury, Internal Revenue Service, ‘Quarterly Publication of Individuals, Who
Have Chosen To Expatriate, as Required by Section 6039G’ (1st quarter, 2019), 84 FR 20954 (13 May
2019) (showing 1019 individuals).
49 OECD Tax Database, available at http://www.oecd.org/tax/tax-policy/tax-database.htm#pit
(accessed 3 October 2019).
50 Ordower (n 26).
51 OECD Tax Database (n 49).
52 IRC §1(h) (net capital gain taxed at a maximum 20% marginal rate). As late as 1989, Sweden’s
maximum marginal rate of income tax was approximately 80%. Sweden now imposes a flat rate of 30%
on income from capital but a maximum rate on income from labour of approximately 55% – with some
variation a function of the local income tax. Sven-Olof Lodin et al, Inkomstskatt – en läro- och handbok
i skatterätt (Lund, Studentlitteratur, 2011).
53 IRC §1(h)(10) (qualified dividend preference in the US); dual income tax with a 30% rate on
income from capital in Sweden.
54 In 2018, the corporate income tax rate declined from a maximum of 35 to a flat 21% rate. IRC §11.
55 Effective in 2018, qualified business income yields a 20% deduction so only 80% of qualified business income is taxable. IRC §199A.

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3745996

Immigration, Emigration, Fungible Labour and Progressive Taxation 141
disappeared.56 Such changes in rates and schedular tax structures may discourage wealthy individuals from emigrating and settling in lower taxed countries or
transferring their income producing personal property to low tax jurisdictions but
the success of such tax reductions is not at all certain.57
Decline in maximum rates of tax and occasionally complete disappearance of
taxes on transmission of wealth have limited impact on funding of governmental services and public benefits. While steeply progressive taxes are associated
historically with public benefits and welfare states, even confiscatory taxes on the
wealthiest residents are unlikely to yield sufficient revenue to maintain extensive
governmental functions and services. Moderate income taxpayers must provide
the revenue to fund the demands of modern governments.58 The policy supporting steeply progressive and high income tax rates and taxes on transmission of
wealth at death served primarily to level disparities between wealthier and poorer
residents and limit the growth and maintenance of a privileged and dominant
class in the society.59 Perceptions of worthiness of tax objects changed during the
last decades of the twentieth century. Increasing capital mobility challenged the
commonly held view that income from labour should not be disfavoured in taxation relative to income from capital.60 Arguments prevailed that capital is more
productive than labour so should be taxed at a lower rate than labour is taxed.
If decreased rates of tax and preferential tax treatment of capital gain and other
income from capital do not constrain taxpayers from removing their capital from
their home countries, exit taxes or continuation taxes following exit have become
popular for the home country to capture otherwise lost future tax revenue. The US
has used both a continuation tax61 and an exit tax.62 A continuation tax imposes an
obligation on the taxpayer to pay tax on some or all the taxpayer’s income following change of residence or citizenship.63 Most continuation taxes have limits on
56 In 1976 estates in excess of $600,000 were subject to estate tax in the US, but in 2019 estates become
taxable only in excess of $11.4 million. IRC §2010 (exemption from tax). The maximum estate tax rate
in the US declined from 77% of taxable estates in excess of $10 million in 1976 to 40% of taxable estates
in excess of $11 million. IRC §2001. Sweden repealed its inheritance tax in early 2005, retroactively to
17 December 2004, and its wealth tax in December 2007, retroactively to 1 January 2007. Sweden and
Austria are unusual among OECD members in not having an inheritance or estate tax.
57 See text at nn 40–45, above.
58 Lodin (n 34).
59 Blum and Kalven (n 30) 487.
60 AW Mellon, Taxation: The People’s Business (London, Macmillan, 1924) 56–58.
61 IRC §877.
62 IRC §877A.
63 H Ordower, ‘ The Expatriation Tax, Deferrals, Mark to Market, the Macomber Conundrum and
Doubtful Constitutionality’ (2017) 15 Pittsburgh Tax Review 1, 7. Sweden’s continuation tax(n 46),
in addition to taxing income from all sources for 5 years (obegränsat skattskyldighet), also imposes
limited tax liability of some expatriates on income from capital (begränsat skattskyldighet) for 10
years following change of residence. 3 ch. 19 § Inkomstskattelag (Svensk fӧrfattningssamling [SFS]
1999:1229) (Swed.) (taxing Swedish citizens and permanent residents who leave Sweden on income
from capital). Similarly, Germany has a 10-year continuation tax based on tax avoidance intent as
described in D Gutmann, ‘La lutte contre “l’exil fiscal”: du droit comparé à la politique fiscale’, Le Cercle
des fiscalistes (24 May 2012), available at http://www.lecercledesfiscalistes.com/publication/la-luttecontre-lexil-fiscal-du-droit-compare-a-la-politique-fiscale/234 (accessed 6 June 2019).
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duration, commonly five or 10 years. The US tax had a 10-year durational limit.64
An exit tax imposes a single incident of taxation on the taxpayer’s deferred income
and unrealised gain at the moment of expatriation.65 In the US payment of all or
part of the tax may be deferred if the taxpayer assures payment of the tax through
a bond or through withholding by the third party payer of the income to the
taxpayer.66
Historically, US persons have valued their status as citizens and permanent
residents of the US. Stable governments and developed banking and communication systems in low tax jurisdictions now make US citizenship or the right to
reside permanently less compelling than they once were. Expatriation for wealthy
individuals has become an alternative to continued citizenship or residence when
it diminishes the individual’s tax burden substantially.67 High net worth individuals’ sources of income have globalised. US source income remains taxable in
the US even after expatriation but foreign source income ceases to be so. Some
income follows the residence of its owner and becomes foreign source following
expatriation. For example, unrealised gain on corporate stock, bonds, collectibles,
gemstones, artwork and other personal property would have been US source if
realised and recognised before a US person’s expatriation. If recognition is deferred
until after expatriation, its source shifts to the new residence of the owner68 and it
becomes free from US tax. The expatriation tax is designed to capture the unrealised appreciation as taxable gain to the date of expatriation.69
The US makes it more difficult to shift the incidence of taxation to low tax jurisdictions than other countries with territorial systems do, because the US taxes its
citizens, residents, and domestic corporations70 on their income from all sources
worldwide.71 Despite worldwide taxation, the US generally cedes primary taxing
jurisdiction for income produced outside the US to the country where the income
is produced by crediting foreign taxes paid by the US person.72 If the foreign taxes
64 IRC

§877(d)(2).
Abreu, ‘Taxing Exits’ (1996) 29 UC Davis Law Review 1087 (analysing various proposals to
counteract the tax loss from expatriation with the income tax and the transfer tax systems).
66 IRC §877A (expatriation tax). The French expatriation tax Code général des impôts (Tax Code)
art. 167a (Fr.) (as in effect in 1999) was determined to violate the EU treaty when applied to a French
national moving within the EU. Case C-9/02 Hughes de Lasteyrie du Saillant v Ministère de l’Économie,
des Finances et de l’Industrie [2004] ECR I-2452 (European Court of Justice). The French expatriation tax was permissible, however, when a French national relocated to Switzerland. Case C-355/16
Christian Picart v Ministre des Finances et des Comptes publics (15 March 2018) in which the ECJ determined that the 1999 EU-Switzerland agreement on free movement of persons does not preclude France
from imposing an exit tax on the unrealised gains of a taxpayer who moved to Switzerland but was not
engaged in a trade or business there.
67 Ordower (n 63) 6.
68 IRC §865 (personal property sourced at residence).
69 IRC §877A.
70 Corporate residence for US tax purposes follows place of incorporation rather than seat of management. IRC §7701(a)(4).
71 IRC §61 (defining gross income as all income from whatever source derived). Treasury reg §1.1-1
(worldwide taxation).
72 IRC §901 (foreign tax credit).
65 AG
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are less than the US tax on the income, the US captures a tax amount equal to the
difference between the higher US tax and the foreign tax credited.73 If the foreign
taxes are greater than the US tax, the credit may not exceed the amount of the US
tax.74
To avoid US tax, US investors have two choices – one lawful, one not. There
are also opportunities to defer US tax on the increase in the value of the taxpayer’s
investments. The lawful choice is to relinquish US citizenship or, for non-citizen
residents, the right to reside in the US. That expatriation subjects the former US
citizens and permanent residents to the expatriation tax.75 Tax administration also
has the power to certify seriously tax delinquent individuals to the Department of
State for revocation or denial of issuance of the individual’s passport.76 Tax clearances are a requirement for non-residents exiting the US.77
The unlawful choice has been to secrete investments in foreign jurisdictions
with strong bank secrecy laws so income and wealth remains hidden outside
the US taxing jurisdiction, free from US tax.78 The option of concealing income
and income producing assets in a low tax, bank secrecy jurisdiction came under
intense attack with the enactment of the Foreign Accounts Tax Compliance Act
(FATCA) in 2010.79 That legislation imposed substantial penalties on US taxpayers who failed to disclose their foreign accounts and pay tax on their income from
those accounts. The Act also sanctioned foreign financial institutions accepting
accounts from US taxpayers, which were not reported to US taxing authorities, by
preventing them from participating in US programs, including reduced withholding on investments in the US – a feature important to the institution’s underlying
non-US investors.
Deferring US tax on increase in value is straightforward. Investors may operate businesses through or invest in domestic or foreign corporations and defer
individual tax on the income until the individual shareholder receives distributions or sells the corporate shares. A peculiarity of the US tax system permanently
eliminates the individual tax on gains but not dividends if the shareholder dies
before selling the corporate shares as the decedent’s property receives a new, fair
market value tax basis at the owner’s death.80 A foreign corporation also permits
the deferral of the US corporate-level income tax. Even if its shareholders are
US persons, a foreign corporation is not subject to US taxing jurisdiction except
on that portion of its income from US sources or effectively connected with its
73 IRC

§904 (limitation to US tax on the income).

74 ibid.
75 IRC

§877A (see text to nn 65–66).
§7345 (certification under section 32101 of the FAST Act, Pub L 114-94 (2015) enacted as a
revenue offset).
77 IRC §6851(d); IRS, ‘Departing Alien Clearance (Sailing Permit)’, available at https://www.irs.gov/
individuals/international-taxpayers/departing-alien-clearance-sailing-permit (accessed 3 October
2019).
78 Compare for Scandinavia, Alstadsæter, Johannesen and Zucman (n 40).
79 124 Stat 71, Pub L 97-117 (2010).
80 IRC §1014.
76 IRC
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conduct of a US trade or business.81 Most distributions of foreign source earnings
of the foreign corporation to its non-corporate US owners become taxable in the
US.82 Since 2018, distributions of foreign source earnings to corporate shareholders that own at least 10 per cent of the voting rights in or the value of shares in the
foreign corporation, that is, corporate US shareholders,83 are free from US income
tax on distributions from a foreign corporation under the 100 per cent dividends
received deduction.84
The US has deployed an array of complex anti-avoidance or anti-deferral
rules to prevent taxpayers from exploiting corporate limitations on US taxation
of foreign source income. Some income of CFCs is taxable to the corporation’s
US shareholders if the placement of foreign source income serves no non-tax
business purpose.85 Passive investment income as well as sales and service
income unrelated to the CFC’s country of incorporation86 trigger the inclusion to the shareholders as if the CFC were a tax transparent entity similar to
a partnership.87 US persons who invest in foreign investment companies may
defer inclusion of the foreign investment company’s income but when they sell
their interests in the foreign company or receive distributions, the gain does not
enjoy preferential rates on capital gains, and the gains and dividends become
subject to an interest charge.88 A decedent’s estate does not get a new basis in
foreign investment company shares so the estate’s beneficiaries remain subject
to the interest charge on the increase in value of the investment in the foreign
investment company.89 US corporations converting to foreign corporations
to avoid US taxation on their foreign source income are caught by the antiinversion provisions90 subjecting them to continuing taxation of their foreign
source income in the US.

81 IRC

§881 (fixed and determinable periodic income); IRC §882 (effectively connected income).
§316 (defining dividend as a distribution from any corporation’s earnings and profits); IRC
§301 (including dividends in the shareholder’s income).
83 Under IRC §951(b) (defining United States (US) shareholder except under IRC §245A the distributing corporation need not be a controlled foreign corporation (‘CFC’). A CFC defined in IRC §957 (e)
is a corporation in which US shareholders own more than half the voting power and share value.
84 IRC §245A (anti-avoidance rules limit the value of the exclusion). IRC §951A taxes returns in
excess of 10% of a CFC’s tangible assets as subpart F income under the CFC provisions as global intangible income. IRC §59A imposes an additional base erosion alternative tax on related party transactions.
85 IRC §951.
86 Foreign base company income is subpart F income under IRC §952 included to the shareholders
under IRC §951(a). IRC §954(a) (foreign base company income).
87 IRC §951(a). Inclusion of CFC income is not fully transparent. Subpart F income that would have
been capital gain to the corporation does not retain its character as capital gain to the US shareholders.
88 IRC §1291 (income from a passive foreign investment company defined in IRC §1297). A taxpayer
may avoid the unfavourable effect of these rules by electing to include the income of the foreign
company in US income annually. IRC §1295 (qualified electing fund); IRC §1293 (inclusion of pro rata
share of qualified electing fund income).
89 IRC §1291(e).
90 IRC §7874 (taxing all or part of a foreign entity’s income in the US either as if it were a US entity
or under a continuation tax following expatriation of the entity).
82 IRC
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IV. Investors and Investor Immigrants
(Commodifying Immigration)
As the US and other countries seek to limit expatriation of revenue, capital and
people to protect the domestic tax base, there is active competition among jurisdictions, including the US, to attract cross-border capital and people. The global
competition for capital is powerful and possibly destructive when it becomes a
‘race to the bottom’ of income inclusion and tax rates.
The US taxes the US-source investment income of non-resident alien individuals91 and foreign corporations on its gross amount by requiring the person making
any payment of US source income to a non-resident alien or foreign corporation
to withhold92 30 per cent of the gross payment.93 The US competes for the foreign
investment capital with double tax treaties that reduce that rate of tax on interest,
dividends, royalties and other investment income94 and with exemptions from the
withholding tax for the interest paid on deposits in financial institutions95 and on
portfolio indebtedness.96
State and local governmental units offer a variety of direct and tax subsidies to
induce the enterprises planning to operate in the US to choose a specific locale.
The practice of tax subsidy competition has generated a robust bidding process
among states and localities in the US with questionable returns to the locality in
exchange for considerable loss of tax revenue. The subsidies often do not require
a permanent commitment from the enterprise and occasionally leave the locality with an ongoing facilities’ burden after the enterprise ceases its operations
there.97
Some low tax jurisdictions have competed actively for investor capital by offering bank secrecy and low or no income tax on the earnings of non-residents.
The OECD targeted these jurisdictions as engaging in harmful tax practices in
a 1998 initiative98 leading to increased transparency and information sharing by

91 IRC §7701(b)(1)(B) (defining nonresident alien as an individual neither a citizen nor resident of
the US).
92 IRC §1441 (withholding requirement).
93 IRC §871 (tax on fixed, determinable, annual or periodic income of nonresident aliens); IRC §881
(similarly, foreign corporations).
94 For example, Art. X of the United States – Canada Income Tax Convention, available at https://
www.irs.gov/pub/irs-trty/canada.pdf (accessed 8 June 2019) reduces the withholding rate of dividends
to 10% for certain corporate recipients and 15% for others.
95 IRC §871(i).
96 IRC §§ 871(h), 881(c). Portfolio interest is non-contingent interest paid pursuant to a registered
debt instrument.
97 H Ordower, ‘Les Impôts Relatifs aux Investissements Étrangers aux États-Unis d’Amérique (observations générales)’ (1996) 1996-2 Revue Internationale de Droit Economique 185.
98 G Makhlouf, ‘Current Status of OECD’s Harmful Tax Practices Initiative A statement by the
Chairman of the OECD’s Committee on Fiscal Affairs’ (2002), available at http://www.oecd.org/
general/searchresults/?q=unfair%20tax%20competition&cx=012432601748511391518:xzeadub0b0a
&cof=FORID:11&ie=UTF-8 (accessed 8 June 2019).
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the targeted jurisdictions.99 A second initiative on base erosion and profit shifting
(BEPS) has continued the effort to achieve greater transparency with uniformity in
tax rules to prevent arbitrage especially through use of hybrid structures.100
Such international efforts to limit tax competition may have motivated investors to become immigrants seeking the most favourable living and investment
bases rather than simply moving capital. An emerging international competition issue has focused on ‘golden’ visas, including money laundering and similar
concerns surrounding their issuance.101 Rather than offering tax or direct subsidies for investment, countries with golden visa regimes expedite the immigration
process for investors who bring substantial investment capital to the receiving
country.
Under golden visa programmes, investor immigrants invest designated minimal amounts in the receiving country in exchange for the privilege to enter and
reside there.102 Some Caribbean island states exchange immediate citizenship
for a fee rather than an investment commitment.103 The amounts and industries in which the investments must be made are not uniform among countries.
Economically developed countries like the US require a larger investment
commitment than do countries looking to capture international capital to assist
the country’s lagging economic development.104 Several countries also provide
investor immigrants with temporarily favoured tax treatment.105 Others are low
tax jurisdictions that welcome investors from high tax jurisdictions who may wish
to avoid or evade taxes in their home countries by changing their residence or
citizenship.106 Investor immigrants are desired and desirable as they add capital to
the receiving country’s economy.
Investor immigrants to the US are subject to general US taxing jurisdiction under the US worldwide taxation system when they become US residents.
Their foreign source income draws a credit for taxes paid to foreign jurisdictions. Immigration for tax reasons is practical only for investors subject to taxes
equal to or higher than US taxes in the country from which they are emigrating.

99 OECD, Harmful Tax Practices – 2018 Progress Report on Preferential Regimes; Inclusive Framework
on BEPS: Action 5, available at https://www.oecd.org/tax/beps/harmful-tax-practices-2018-progressreport-on-preferential-regimes-9789264311480-en.htm (accessed 9 June 2019).
100 OECD, ‘Base Erosion and Profit Shifting’, available at http://www.oecd.org/tax/beps/ (accessed 3
October 2019).
101 C Yeginsu, ‘What Are Britain’s “Golden Visas,” and Why Are They Being Suspended?’ New
York Times (6 December 2018), available at https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/06/world/europe/
uk-golden-visa-suspended.html (accessed 4 October 2019) (expressing concern about Russian
oligarchs’ use of the British programme for money laundering).
102 Adim (n 38); Christians (n 38).
103 Adim (n 38) 122.
104 Christians (n 38) 57.
105 Ibid, 51 (discussing Italy’s new programme, and comparison with Portugal, Malta, Ireland); RA
Papotti and L Ferro, ‘Italy’s Attractive New Tax Regime for Wealthy Pensioners’ Tax Notes International
(29 April 2019) 343.
106 FATCA legislation in the US (n 79); harmful tax competition and BEPS initiatives of the OECD
(nn 98 and 100).
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Where their emigration jurisdiction has lower taxes than the US, investor visas
are desirable only from non-tax perspectives – opportunities, lifestyle, safety, etc.
As investors they enjoy the tax advantages currently favouring capital over labour
in the US,107 including the absence of any social security tax on income from
capital,108 preferential rates for net capital gain and dividends,109 deferral of inclusion in income of appreciation in the value of their property,110 rapid tax recovery
of many capital expenditures,111 and a deduction of 20 per cent of the income from
the conduct of a trade or business in the US.112

V. Educated and Skilled Labour
A. Skilled Immigrants
Countries also tend to welcome immigrants or temporary workers with specific
skills in a variety of fields. The US has many immigration priority programs for
educated and skilled workers.113 Jobs for individuals with skills or training often
pay better than jobs in the immigrant’s country of origin. Like investor immigrants, skilled immigrants are subject to the general taxing jurisdiction of the
US on their worldwide income. Unlike investor immigrants, skilled immigrants
receive payment for services and do not enjoy the advantages of the current US
preferences for income from capital. Since their visa status is employment dependent, they may not conduct an independent trade or business yielding the qualified
business income deduction.114 They must pay social security taxes but those with
high demand skills may draw wages exceeding the social security earnings cap
so only part of their wages are subject to the social security tax.115 Some skilled
employee visas permit conversion to permanent residence116 and access to social
security benefits at retirement age unavailable to other temporary workers who
may not work in the US sufficiently long to qualify for benefits.117 Employers also
107 Generally

n 39 (text accompanying and following).
§3101 (6.2% tax on wages); IRC §1401 (tax on self-employment income).
109 IRC §1(h) (maximum rate on net capital gains and dividends).
110 IRC §1001 (gain from sale or other disposition of property).
111 IRC §168(k) (bonus depreciation).
112 IRC §199A (n 55 and accompanying text).
113 For example, USCIS, ‘H-1B Specialty Occupations’, available at https://www.uscis.gov/
working-united-states/temporary-workers/h-1b-specialty-occupations-dod-cooperative-researchand-development-project-workers-and-fashion-models (accessed 4 October 2019).
114 IRC §199A (n 55 and accompanying text) (qualified business income).
115 IRC §3101. In 2019, wages in excess of $132,900 are free from the social security tax. ‘Social Security
Fact Sheet 2019 Social Security Changes’, available at https://www.ssa.gov/news/press/factsheets/colafacts2019.pdf (accessed 9 June 2019). Those who never become permanent residents are unlikely to
draw any benefits under the social security system.
116 H1-B visas are dual purpose and permit application for green cards while other temporary work
visas do not (text to n 113, above).
117 nn 125–126, below, and accompanying text.
108 IRC
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may offer various deferred compensation arrangements and, for some occupations, provide non-taxable benefits including housing and meals.118 High wages
may give the workers the opportunity to accumulate disposable income for investment to capture capital taxation benefits as investor immigrants do.

B. Skilled Emigrants
Economically developing countries educate promising young citizens at government expense to develop an indigenous pool of skilled and educated workers. Those
individuals are among the most desired candidates for immigration to economically developed countries where their skills also are needed. Salaries higher than
those possible in their home country and better opportunities for family members
are seductive, despite any privileges their education might afford them at home.
Emigration thwarts the home country’s plans for those individuals to fulfil important societal roles and advance the country’s development. Prohibiting emigration
provides a solution but raises human rights concerns. These privileged individuals consumed considerable amounts from limited national wealth to become who
they are. Repayment in some manner may be appropriate.119 Other countries
impose a special fee or tax requiring an emigrant to repay all or part of the cost
or value of the education or training as an exit tax or a continuation tax following
emigration.120

VI. Fungible Labour: Authorised and
Unauthorised Immigrants
Many jobs require limited skills and training. The workers doing the jobs are
substantially fungible. While unskilled jobs require some training – even specialised training in many instances – the necessary skills are relatively easy to learn
and the shift from one unskilled job to another carries a moderate or low retraining cost. Unlike skilled and educated workers,121 fungible workers receive limited
amounts of nontaxable fringe benefits. Most fungible workers are subject to wage
taxes on all their income because they do not earn more than the social security
118 IRC §119 (exclusion from gross income of meals and lodging provided for the convenience of the
employer).
119 US Army, ‘Earn Your Degree Through ROTC’, available at https://www.goarmy.com/benefits/
education-benefits/earn-your-degree-through-rotc.html (accessed 18 September 2019) (example of
US service commitment military education programmes).
120 T Boeri, H Brucker, F Doquier and H Rapoport (eds), Brain Drain and Brain Gain The Global
Competition to Attract High-Skilled Migrants (Oxford, OUP, 2012); G Block and M Blake, Debating
Brain Drain: May Governments Restrict Emigration? (Oxford, OUP, 2015); and literature cited at n 18,
above.
121 nn 113–120 above, and accompanying text.
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tax ceiling. They spend the bulk of their income on necessaries, leaving them little
opportunity to accumulate wealth. In countries with VAT, substantially all of a
fungible worker’s income is subject to VAT as well as wage taxes. Fungible workers
constitute much of the taxpaying public, bear a considerable portion of the burden
of paying for government,122 and are affected most profoundly as tax burdens shift
from capital to labour.
Included in the pool of fungible labour are many immigrants who are low
wage workers invited – sometimes temporarily as guest workers, sometimes as
immigrants – to fill labour shortages. They are the Chinese labourers who built the
US transcontinental railway;123 the Mexicans, Central Americans and Filipinos
who harvest crops; the Ukrainians, Lithuanians, Latvians, Caribbean islanders
and Central Americans who provide cleaning services and home care for children,
the elderly and individuals with disabilities. Some immigrate with the receiving
government’s authorisation and permission to work temporarily124 or permanently, but many others enter without authorisation or with authorisation that
does not permit them to work.
Once immigrants, whether temporary or permanent, reside in the US, their
incomes become subject to the income tax and their wages to social security and
Medicare taxes, although many will not reside in the US for the 10 years necessary
to become eligible for retirement benefits under social security.125 Many temporary workers and some immigrants who later reside outside the US lose benefits
after six months outside the US.126 Anyone buying items in the US pays state and
local sales and use taxes even if the items are necessities for living. States vary with
respect to items they may exempt from the state sales tax.127
In the US low wage earners qualify for a negative income tax128 on their labour
income.129 The credit is substantial130 but as the taxpayer’s income increases, the
credit rapidly phases out.131 The credit does not help unemployed individuals
and the phase out effectively imposes an additional 21 per cent tax on increases
in wages in the phase-out range. Taxpayers lose the credit if they have income
122 n

34 above, and accompanying text.
16, above, and accompanying text.
124 USCIS, ‘H-2A, B temporary workers’, available at https://www.uscis.gov/working-united-states/
temporary-nonimmigrant-workers (accessed 18 September 2019).
125 Social Security Administration, ‘Retirement Benefits’, available at https://www.ssa.gov/pubs/
EN-05-10035.pdf (accessed 10 June 2019).
126 20 CFR § 404.460 (nonpayment of monthly benefits to aliens outside the United States).
127 For example, New York State Department of Taxation and Finance, ‘Lists of Exempt and Taxable
Clothing, Footwear, and Items Used to Make or Repair Exempt Clothing’, Tax Bulletin ST-530
(TB-ST-530) (10 March 2014), available at https://www.tax.ny.gov/pubs_and_bulls/tg_bulletins/st/
clothing_chart.htm (accessed 10 June 2019).
128 IRC §32 (inflation adjusted, refundable credit designed originally to balance the social security
tax).
129 IRC §32(c)(2) (wages plus self-employment income).
130 IRC §32(b) (as much as 45% of the taxpayer’s earned income not exceeding $14,570 in 2019 if the
taxpayer has three or more qualifying children).
131 ibid. The phase-out is 21.06% of each dollar over $24,820 for married taxpayers filing jointly: Rev
Proc 2018-57, 2018-49 IRB 19 (phase-out tables).
123 n
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from capital exceeding a low threshold, thus discouraging any accumulation of
wealth by low income individuals.132 Fear of examination by the taxing authority
may discourage taxpayers from claiming the credit since taxpayers claiming the
credit are examined more frequently than taxpayers with much greater incomes.133
Taxpayers who do not have social security numbers are ineligible for the credit
even if they have alternate taxpayer identification134 and meet the other qualifications for the credit. Unauthorised workers may pay social security and income
taxes but may not claim the earned income credit.135
Unauthorised immigrants are subject to deportation and have little hope of
gaining authorised status. Unless they secure false papers or alternative taxpayer
identification,136 unauthorised immigrants may not accept work in the formal
economy of the country. They participate primarily in the informal economy in
which they receive payment for their services or the goods they sell in cash or in
barter goods and services. Generally they accept payments for their services at
rates substantially below the formal economy market rate.137 Such service value
discounts are necessary to entice service recipients to use unauthorised workers’
services rather than those offered in the formal market. Unauthorised workers
frequently find employment in occupations in which supplies of authorised workers are inadequate or that authorised workers do not want. Many unauthorised
workers are in household occupations where their employer is in need of the
services but is unwilling or unable to pay formal market rates. The payments generally would yield no tax deduction for the employer so payments in cash outside the
formal economy are not of any consequence to the employers.138 Even when they
might provide a tax benefit to the employer,139 the wages may be sufficiently low
that the tax benefit would not match the wage differential for authorised workers.
Many unauthorised workers without tax identification do not report their
income for income tax purposes. Failure to report income poses risks of both
civil and criminal penalties since their obligation to report and pay taxes is
132 IRC

§32(i)(2); Rev Proc 2018-57 (n 131) (threshold amount in 2019 is $3,600).
Kiel, J Eisinger, and Propublica, ‘The Golden Age of Rich People Not Paying Their Taxes’, The
Atlantic (11 December 2018), available at https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2018/12/richpeople-are-getting-away-not-paying-their-taxes/577798/ (accessed 4 October 2019).
134 The US issues individual taxpayer identification numbers (ITIN) on request to individuals not
authorised to work in the US but who have income to report in the US. IRS, ‘Instructions for Form
W-7’, available at https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/iw7.pdf (accessed 4 October 2019).
135 In some cases they may claim the child tax credit under IRC §24 because the child is a citizen of
the US by birth in the US and has a social security number.
136 US taxpayer identification, for example (see n 134).
137 The informal (or underground economy) operates primarily in cash outside the banking system
and government regulation. Workers are paid at below market rates and have no little or no job protection. International Labour Organization, ‘More than 60 per cent of the world’s employed population are
in the informal economy’ (8 April 2018), available at https://www.ilo.org/global/about-the-ilo/newsroom/news/WCMS_627189/lang--en/index.htm (accessed 4 October 2019).
138 Homecare workers for children, infirm and aged individuals, for example, generally nondeductible in any event as a personal expense under IRC §262 or the low wages in the informal
economy being more valuable than a tax credit in those instances in which a credit is available. IRC §21.
139 IRC §21 (dependent care expense credit, for example).
133 P
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independent of immigration status. If they were authorised workers, the incomes
of many would lie below the threshold at which an income tax otherwise might
be payable140 but, in most instances, a wage-based social security tax would be
payable. In the US such low income workers if authorised to work in the US might
qualify for the earned income credit.141 Thus, they are disadvantaged relative to
authorised workers both in wage levels and access to a low wage tax benefit. While
many unauthorised immigrants may not pay an income tax, they do pay consumption taxes142 and excise taxes as they consume and indirectly pay property taxes in
their housing rent.143

VII. Conclusion
Taxation plays a role in immigration and emigration and seems to drive some
decisions to migrate from high to low tax jurisdictions. Capital mobility and
labour immobility argue in favour of decreasing taxes on capital to prevent capital
flight even if the decrease means shifting tax burdens to labour. Decreased taxes on
capital, however, do not guarantee that capital will not flee. Another jurisdiction
may offer still lower taxes and generate conditions for tax decrease competition,
depriving the taxing jurisdiction of needed revenue. A race to the bottom on capital taxes enhances disparities between wealthy and poor residents and is unlikely
to benefit developed economies. Growth of a privileged class undercuts longstanding commitments in advanced democracies to equality and equal opportunity.
Uncertainty for fungible, immigrant workers, both authorised and unauthorised, as to whether they will be permitted to remain in the country to which they
have migrated often leaves them targets for exploitation. The immigrants accept
low wages with few opportunities to organise to demand fairer wage treatment.
Withholding to pay income and social security taxes from which they are unlikely
to benefit further reduces already low wage income. Anti-immigrant government
policies amplify uncertainty for fungible, immigrant workers and further exert
downward pressure on wages assisting American business in keeping wages low
and enhancing profitability.
Ability to pay – vertical equity – as a fundamental principle of taxation and
resulting redistribution of wealth through strong welfare systems that provide for

140 The income tax system of each developed economy does not tax incomes that fall below a minimum amount. That amount differs from country to country. In the US, the standard deduction under
IRC §63 currently is $12,000 so that incomes less than that amount are not taxable. In Germany, a
subsistence minimum must remain free from the income tax under the Constitutional Court’s decision
BVerfGE 82, 60, 85 (29 Mai 1990, 1st Senat).
141 IRC §32 (n 128 above, and accompanying text).
142 The US has no national consumption tax but most of the states of the US have retail sales taxes.
143 A Stevenson (A Jurow Kleiman), ‘Improving the US Guest Worker System through Tax and Social
Welfare Reform’ (2014) 17 Harvard Latino Law Review 147 (providing an excellent discussion of these
issues).
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the needs of all remain as compelling today as they were when many economically
developed countries chose to impose steeply progressive taxes. Yet the focus on
competing for capital resources seems to have supplanted principles of fairness
and ability to pay and resulted in increasingly flat or regressive taxation. Tax rate
competition for capital seems a doubtful strategy heading toward a zero tax on
capital income and raises the question of whether something else – immigrant
exploitation, wealth-based power disparities – motivates countries to shift tax
burdens from capital to labour.
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